generalized facts or laws differ from causes. That day and night follow each other may be represented as a general law ; hut we cannot speak of the night -causing the day, or the day causing the night. Using the term "law of nature "in the sense of a generalized set of facts, we cannot speak of the action of a general law, or ascribe to it a power of production.* These generalized or general laws, it may be farther noticed, are not simple but composite, and the result, as we shall see in a future section, of adjustments often very complicated and recondite.

The power of the sun's rays to colour vegetable juices, is an example of a property. The sun's rays lulling on the juices, is an instance of a cause—the two components of which are the sun's rays and the chemical elements of the leaves. Those cosmical arrangements by winch the sun's rays fall daily on the plants, and by which they fall on them more powerfully and for a greater length of time during summe'r—these give the annual cycle of the colouring of the leaves of plants, which may be taken as an illustration of a general law, the result of the mutual adjustment of many bodies possessing different properties.

It is of the iitrriust importance that we he able to separate these three tilings. To some extent connected, in that they all imply order, they differ in other and more important respects. Properties are simple, being the rule of the action of bodies upon one another. Material causes are always duplex or complex, implying the exercise of the properties of more than one body. General laws are necessarily multiplex, and are not the causes but the results of a vast number of arrangements. The first, or properties as we shall call them, are capable of action only when certain needful conditions are fulfilled. The second, or causes, are these properties in operation in consequence of the conditions of action being furnished. The third, or general laws

as we shall call them, are a collection of natural objects so resembling each other that we class them together. In a loOso way, it may be proper enough to call them all by one name, as significant of the order which reigns in the world; but in doing BO there is always a risk of our nliding unconBciously from the

* While preparing this 4th edition, we are gratified to notico a Kirnilar statement by M. I'revost, just published In Sir William Hamilton's edition of Stewart, vol. iii., A p., Art. II, **<!e PUBKC aremarquer ladiflYirenco entre *ltd* et *Miiine** Due loi est tin rapport , . . uno generalization; tmo loi no peut agir. Tl faut done ua agent j uuo cause, pour rtialifter u» ckangeme&t."